Configurations study for the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices of power by Fabrice Barthélémy & Mathieu Martin
Conﬁgurations study for the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik
indices of power
Fabrice BARTH´ EL´ EMY∗ and Mathieu MARTIN†
Summary How can we count and list all the Banzhaf or Shapley-Shubik index of power
conﬁgurations for a given number of players? There is no formula in the literature that may
give the cardinal of such a set, and moreover, even if this formula had existed, there is no
formula which gives the conﬁguration vectors. Even if we do not present such a formula,
we present a methodology which enables to determine the set of conﬁgurations and its
cardinality.
JEL classiﬁcation: C7, D7
1I n t r o d u c t i o n
It is now well known, thanks to the cooperative game theory and more particularly to the
theory of the power indices, that the voting power is quite diﬀerent from the distribution of
weights. Hence, having a positive weight does not ensure to have a positive voting power;
diﬀerent weights may lead to the same voting power measure and so on. The literature
about power indices is very abundant and the central question is how to measure the power.
Unfortunately, there are several measures of power represented by diﬀerent power indices.
All of them admit the importance of a particular player, the decisive player. This player is
so that when added to a losing coalition, the latter becomes a winning one. The measure
of power depends on the way the coalitions are built. In this paper, we only consider the
two most important power indices, the Shapley-Shubik (1954) power index and the Banzhaf
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1(1965) power index. A complete description of the power indices is given in Felsenthal and
Machover (1998), Laruelle (1998) or in Leech (2002a), among others.
In many problems, it is important to know all the possible distributions of power among
the players. For example, if we want to workout the probability for the two power indices to
give the same distribution of power, it is necessary to determine all the admissible vectors
of power1. Our problem in this paper is then to know how to count and list all the possible
conﬁgurations of power for a given number of players. As far as we know, there is no
formula in the literature that may give the cardinal of such a set, and moreover, even if
it had existed, there is no formula which gives the diﬀerent power index conﬁgurations.
Obviously, to determine all the possible conﬁgurations of power, we have to know the
diﬀerent repartitions of weight.
The purpose of this paper is to present some tables with the number of repartitions
for a given number of players and give the diﬀerent conﬁgurations for the standard indices
of power. Obtaining all the power conﬁgurations and listing them is not trivial and but
impossible to work without a computer as soon as the number of players is superior to 4.
In order to present some basic elements of cooperative game theory, let [q;w1,...,w n]
be a voting game where n is the number of players, q is the quota and wi is the weight of
the player i.W eh a v e
n
i=1 wi =¯ w and q<¯ w (q and wi, for all i, are integers). Without
loss of generality, we assume that w1  w2  ...  wn. We say that a coalition S (that is a
group of players) is winning if and only if

i∈S wi  q.W ed e n o t eW the set of all winning
coalitions. If S ∈ W, we attribute a value 1 to S, denoted v(S)=1a n di fS  ∈ W,w eh a v e
v(S) = 0. We only consider proper voting games as if S ∈ W,t h e nN\S  ∈ W.I n o t h e r
words, q> ¯ w
2 .
Several power indices are proposed in the literature and all of them admit the importance
of a particular player, the decisive player. This player is so that v(S) = 1 when he belongs to
the coalition S and v(S\{i})=0( t h a ti sw h e ni leaves the coalition S). The Shapley-Shubik




(|S| − 1)!(n − |S|)!
n!
[v(S) − v(S\{i})]
1Such a problem is studied by Barth´ el´ emy, Martin, Merlin (2007).
2The notation |A| represents the cardinal of the set A.
2Since v(S)=0o rv(S)=1 ,[ v(S) − v(S\{i})] is non-null only if the player i is decisive in
S3.








Then each voting game [q;w1,...,w n] ∈ Nn+1 corresponds to a Shapley-Shubik conﬁg-
uration of power (or a vector of power) (φ1,...,φn) ∈ Rn and a Banzhaf conﬁguration of
power (β1,...,βn) ∈ Rn.W ei n s i s th e r eo na ni m p o r t a n tp o i n to fv o c a b u l a r y :t h e r ei sa n
important distinction between the repartitions of weights and the conﬁgurations of power.
A repartition of weights (or simply repartition) is just a vector (w1,...,w n) ∈ Nn and a
conﬁguration of power (or simply conﬁguration) is a vector of power. We associate only
one conﬁguration to a repartition but there is no boubt that several repartitions may be
associated to a conﬁguration.
Various methods are available to compute the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices.
See Leech (2002a), for instance, for a description of each method and their relative inter-
est. The direct enumeration consists in applying directly the deﬁnition of the indices. An
important limit of this approach is the number of players, which must remain under 31.
Generating functions, suggested by Mann and Shapley (1962) enable to deal with higher
number of players (up to 200) and give the exact result. The Monte Carlo simulations pre-
sented by Mann and Shapley (1960) are an approximation like the Multilinear Extensions
Approximation methods developed by Owen (1972, 1975) and modiﬁed by Leech (2003).
Here, as we focus on exact power index values, the use of generating functions seems to be
more appropriate4. In the same spirit, counting and listing all the possible weight repar-
titions may be linked to a more general problem consisting on counting and listing all the
subsets of the set {1,2,..., ¯ w}, the sum of the subsets being always equal to ¯ w.T h ea l g o -
rithm of Stojmenivi´ c and Miyakawa (1988) enables to decompose the integer n from 1 to n
elements, the sum of the subsets being always equal to n. We are looking for all the vectors
(w1,w 2,...,w n)w i t hw1  w2  ...  wn and
n
i=1 wi =¯ w5.
3In the literature, a decisive player is called a pivotal player in the Shapley-Shubik index.
4Let us notice that however, the approximation proposed by Leech (2003) is incredibly precise.
5Many relative issues are linked to this problem as generating all the r-subsets (subsets containing r
elements) of the set {1,2,...,n},f o r1a r a n or the knapsack problem, where here the seats repartition
vector has to be maximised under an inequality constraint, the sum being less or equal to C, the total
3The methodology we suggest to list the diﬀerent Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf conﬁgura-
tions is analyzed in section 2. Next in section 3, we count and list the conﬁgurations. Four
cases are analyzed: indeed, the total number of weights and the quota may be constrained
or not. Clearly, it is diﬀerent to determine the number of conﬁgurations for a given quota
and/or a given total number of weights and the number of conﬁgurations for any quota
and/or any total number of weights. For example, with 3 players, there are 4 conﬁgurations
if we do not ﬁx the quota and the total number of weights and only 2 if the quota is equal
to 5 and the total number of weights is equal to 9. We give a particular attention to the
results comparison between the Shapley-Shubik index and the Banzhaf index.
2M e t h o d o l o g y
2.1 Notation
Let Wn(¯ w), the set of all the possible repartitions in the case of n players and a total number
of weights equals to ¯ w. For instance, in the 3 players case and a total weight equals to 5,





By adding a quota at each element of Wn(¯ w), we deﬁne some diﬀerent voting games.
Let ˜ q = q/¯ w,t h eq u o t ad e ﬁned in proportion6.L e tGn(˜ q, ¯ w) all the n players voting games
with a quota of ˜ q and a total of weights equals to ¯ w. For instance, for the majority case











Each voting game [˜ q;w1,...,w n], corresponds to a conﬁguration (for the Banzhaf and
for Shapley-Shubik indices). For each couple (˜ q, ¯ w) ∈ [1
2,1[×N∗,w ed e ﬁne Cn(˜ q, ¯ w)a st h e
number of seats. Ehrlich (1973) described a loopless procedure for generating subsets of a set of n elements.
A procedure based on gray codes is in Nijenhuis and Wilf (1983) where an algorithm for generating all
r-subsets in lexicographic order (1 a r a m a n) is also proposed. Semba (1984) improved this algorithm.
Borgwardt and Tremel (1991) deal with the problem of approximation in the knapsack problem.
6The quota q is an integer whose range depends on ¯ w and n values: n/2 a q a ¯ w −1. Then ˜ q represents
simply a proportion which lies in the ]
1
2,1[ interval.
4set of all the possible conﬁgurations. Hence Cn(˜ q, ¯ w) is the set of all the index of power
conﬁgurations for the voting games [˜ q;w1,...,w n], where
n
i=1 wi =¯ w, the quota being
expressed in proportion. For the n players voting games, let us deﬁne the notations for the
sets of all the possible indices of power conﬁgurations according to constraints on ¯ w and/or
on ˜ q. This leads to four cases as underlined in the table 1.
Table 1: The diﬀerent conﬁgurations set according to constraints
˜ q
¯ w constrained not constrained
constrained Cn(˜ q, ¯ w) (sections 2.1.1 and 3.1) Cn(., ¯ w) (sections 2.1.3 and 3.3)
not constrained Cn(˜ q,.) (sections 2.1.2 and 3.2) Cn(.,.) (sections 2.1.4 and 3.4)
The four notations will be described in the four next subsections. Let’s denote more par-
ticularly C
B
n () and C
SS
n () the set of conﬁgurations corresponding respectively to the Banzhaf
and to the Shapley-Shubik indices of power.
2.1.1 Set of conﬁgurations with ˜ q and ¯ w constrained
To ﬁnd the set Cn(˜ q, ¯ w), we may list all the possible repartitions of weights and take the
union of all the corresponding conﬁgurations of power. For instance, in the majority case
of 3 players and total weight of 3, there are three diﬀerent repartitions (3,0,0), (2,1,0)
and (1,1,1) which lead respectively to the following conﬁgurations (1,0,0), (1,0,0) and
(1
2, 1
2,0). Hence, the union of these 3 sets gives the set of all the conﬁgurations that exist













































5Let us notice that the following repartitions (10,0,0), (9,1,0), (8,2,0), (8,1,1), (7,3,0),
(7,2,1) and (6,4,0) lead to the same conﬁguration (1,0,0) in the majority case. Moreover,








2.1.2 Set of conﬁgurations with a constrained ˜ q (¯ w is not constrained)
For a given quota in proportion ˜ q,w ed e ﬁne the set Cn(˜ q,.) as the set of all the possible




Cn(˜ q, ¯ w)
For instance, with n =3a n d˜ q = 1
2, table 2 details for ¯ w =1 ,...,4 the diﬀerent reparti-
tions and the corresponding conﬁgurations7.T h eC3(1
2,.) sets are obtained by the inﬁnite
union of the C
B
3 (1
2, ¯ w)f o r ¯ w  1. As we know that there are analytically only 4 diﬀerent
conﬁgurations, we may conclude that the union of the four ﬁrst sets enables to list all the






















































2.1.3 Set of conﬁgurations with a constrained ¯ w (˜ q is not constrained)
For a given sum of weights ¯ w,w ed e ﬁne the set Cn(., ¯ w)a st h es e to fa l lt h ep o s s i b l e




Cn(˜ q, ¯ w)
Let us notice that as q and ¯ w are integers, we do not need to analyze all the real values
lying in [1
2,1]. For example, assuming that ¯ w = 5, there are only two8 diﬀerent quotas,
q =3a n dq = 4. Remark that for all q/¯ w ∈ [0.5,0.8[ the conﬁgurations are identical and
7We denote ˜ q =
1
2 the well-known majority game where q =
¯ w
2 +1i f ¯ w is even and q =
¯ w+1
2 if ¯ w is odd.
8There is one more available quota which is equal to ¯ w, which corresponds to ˜ q =1 .
6Table 2: Conﬁgurations according to ¯ w with 3 players in the majority case
¯ w Repartition of weights Banzhaf Shapley-Shubik
(w1,w 2,w 3) conﬁgurations conﬁgurations
1 (1,0,0) (1,0,0) (1,0,0)





























this is same for all q/¯ w ∈ [0.8,1[. More generally, there are: ( ¯ w/2) − 1d i ﬀerent values of q
if ¯ w is even and ( ¯ w − 1)/2d i ﬀerent values of q if ¯ w is odd.
For instance, with n =3a n d ¯ w =5 ,t a b l e3d e t a i l sf o r˜ q = {3/5,4/5} the diﬀerent
repartitions and the corresponding conﬁgurations.
Table 3: Conﬁgurations according to ˜ q with 3 players in the majority case
Repartitions of weights Banzhaf conﬁgurations according to ˜ q
























































72.1.4 Set of conﬁgurations with ˜ q and ¯ w not constrained
We present here the most common case. Given the number of players, our problem is to
determine all the conﬁgurations without ﬁx˜ q and ¯ w.










Cn(˜ q, ¯ w)
Q
2.2 Presentation of the methodology
Our method is based on the fact that all the diﬀerent conﬁgurations for a given number
of players (n)i na˜ q majority voting game can be obtained by taking the union of k ﬁrst
Cn(˜ q, ¯ w) sets, as the total number of conﬁgurations is ﬁnite9:
∃k ∈ N, Cn(˜ q,.)=

¯ wak
Cn(˜ q, ¯ w)
For instance, let’s take the example presented in table 2. By calculus, we know that
there are 4 diﬀerent conﬁgurations with 3 players in the majority case for the Banzhaf and








































e e e =4











which implies that the value of k is 4 in this example: that is to say, by taking the union












2,4), we get all the
conﬁgurations for the Banzhaf index, as shown in table 4 (constructed from table 2). Let’s
notice that k does not correspond to a value of ¯ w such as all the conﬁgurations are obtained:
there is no reason for Cn(˜ q,.)=Cn(˜ q,k). Indeed, in the previous example
e e eC3(1
2,.)




e e e=3 .
8Table 4: Increase of the Banzhaf set of conﬁgurations with 3 players according to ¯ w in the
majority case
New conﬁgurations
¯ w with increments
	












































The idea of the method is then to begin with ¯ w = 1, and to increment ¯ w until it is equal
to a given value, denoted here k.W h e n¯ w =1 ,t h ec o n ﬁguration is 1 for the ﬁrst player and
0f o rt h e( n−1) others. Each new value of ¯ w may lead to a new conﬁguration. One interest
of such a method, beginning with low values of ¯ w, is due to the fact that it is much quicker
to list weight repartitions for small values of ¯ w. To be convergent, the method has to give
the right number of conﬁgurations, but it depends on the value of k which is unknown. For
instance, in the previous example, if k is set to 2, (instead of the right value which is 4),
we only get 2 conﬁgurations: {(1,0,0),(1
2, 1
2,0)}. In order to deal with this problem, we
propose to increment ¯ w as long as we have new conﬁgurations. Then, we increment ¯ w as
long as we do not have α consecutive conﬁgurations sets not leading to a new conﬁguration.
The larger α, the higher the conﬁdence of convergence. Obviously, we have the control on
the parameter of convergence α.
For instance, for the example mentioned previously, table 5 illustrates the convergence
principle for some values of ¯ w ∈ {4,5,...,10}:
	
xa ¯ w C3(1
2,x) is constant. Then 4 diﬀerent
conﬁgurations are found: α equals to 6, because six consecutive sets of conﬁgurations10 do
not give a new conﬁguration. Even if we know in this example that the estimated set is
equal to the real set, we have to mention that it is an estimated set, whose cardinality is
estimated as well.
9Obviously, k depends on n and ˜ q which do not appear to avoid tedious notations.








2,10), presented in table 5.



























































































































































































































x ¯ w Cn(˜ q,x)
e e e
Q
in a two dimensional space for successive values of ¯ w.
In the majority case with 3 players, ﬁgure 1 represents the convergence principle for
the Banzhaf index with α =1 0( a sk =4 , ¯ w a 14) and ﬁgure 2 illustrates the case with
4 players (from table A.2 k =8 ,t h e n ¯ w a 18)11.To study the convergence in this method,
we have to list all the conﬁgurations for a given ¯ w. Our approach is based on computer
calculations which are quiet unavoidable, given the high number of calculus involved in this
problematic (except for the well- known cases with 3 or 4 players). In the case of Cn(.,.),
we may analyze all the possible values for the quotas q with a given ¯ w to make sure we get
all the conﬁgurations.
11In the ﬁgures, the notation CN corresponds to “Conﬁgurations Number” and CCN corresponds to
“Cumulative Conﬁgurations Number”.
10Figure 1: Convergence, n =3 ,˜ q = 1
2
Figure 2: Convergence, n =4 ,˜ q = 1
2





∈ Nn gives the indices of power (φ1,...,φn) ∈ Rn for Shapley-Shubik




∈ Nn+1 gives respec-
tively (φ1,...,φn,0) ∈ Rn+1 and (β1,...,βn,0) ∈ Rn+1. Hence, for a given ¯ w,b yt a k i n ga l l
the repartitions of weights leading to
n
i=1 wi =¯ w,w eg e t
∀(φ1,...,φn) ∈ C
SS
n (˜ q, ¯ w) ⇒ (φ1,...,φn,0) ∈ C
SS
n+1(˜ q, ¯ w) for Shapley-Shubik
∀(β1,...,βn) ∈ C
B
n (˜ q, ¯ w) ⇒ (β1,...,βn,0) ∈ C
B
n+1(˜ q, ¯ w) for Banzhaf











In this section, we give the number of conﬁgurations in the four cases described in table 1.
Obviously, our results depend on the power of the computer and they are more signiﬁcant
when ˜ q and ¯ w are constrained. Indeed, we have seen in the previous section that we obtain
the unconstrained cases thanks to the constrained cases.
3.1 Conﬁgurations for a given ¯ w and a given ˜ q
We want to study the Cn(˜ q, ¯ w) sets and their cardinality given the set of repartitions. In
the majority case, table 6 presents the number of conﬁgurations for the Banzhaf index or
the Shapley-Shubik one in the case where n =1 ,...,12 and ¯ w =1 ,...,25. The 2/3c a s ei s
presented in table A.3. We observe that even if the sets C
B
n (˜ q, ¯ w)a n dC
SS
n (˜ q, ¯ w)d i ﬀer their
cardinality is the same12:
∀n,∀˜ q,∀ ¯ w,
e e eC
B
n (˜ q, ¯ w)
e e e =
e e eC
SS
n (˜ q, ¯ w)
e e e
Tables 6 and A.3 illustrate that the number of conﬁgurations
- is increasing with the number of players (given ¯ w).
12This observation holds for all the values of ˜ q that we have computed.
12- is not increasing monotonously with the sum of weights ¯ w (given n).
The non monotonicity in ¯ w when ˜ q =1 /2 is well-known if we refer to the diﬀerence
made between odd and even value of ¯ w. As an illustration, with 5 players there are 25
conﬁgurations with ¯ w =1 8a n d2 4c o n ﬁgurations with ¯ w = 22. This point is more pro-
nounced in the 2/3 case as shown in table A.3. But, we may notice that this is a bit more
complicated issue. For instance, when ˜ q =1 /2 and for even values of ¯ w there is still a non
monotonicity as shown in ﬁg u r e3f o rt h ec a s ew i t h6p l a y e r s .T h ec a s ew i t h ¯ w = 118 leads
to 126 conﬁgurations while there are 135 conﬁgurations with ¯ w = 108 or even with ¯ w =8 4 .
With a smaller value, ¯ w = 48, we get 137 conﬁgurations ( ¯ w =7 2a n d ¯ w =9 6l e a dt ot h e




n (˜ q, ¯ w)
e e e. Hence, we may generate a small conﬁgurations set with a higher ¯ w (remind
than previously, we have noticed that taking a high value of ¯ w does not ensure to get all
the conﬁgurations ; the smaller value leading to all the conﬁgurations was denoted k). This
remark reinforces the methodology we propose (see section 2).
13Table 6: Number of conﬁgurations according to ¯ w and n with ˜ q =1 /2
¯ w
n 3 4 5 678 91 01 1 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 5
1 1 1 1 111 1 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 222 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 2 222 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 3 4 4 444 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 2 3 4 444 4 4 4 4 4 4 4
6 4 6 7 888 8 8 8 8 8 8 8
7 2 3 5 677 7 7 7 7 7 7 7
8 4 8 1 1 1 3 1 4 1 5 1 5 1 5 1 51 51 51 51 5
9 2 3 7 1 0 1 2 1 3 1 4 1 4 1 41 41 41 41 4
1 0 4 8 1 4 1 9 2 2 2 4 2 5 2 6 2 62 62 62 62 6
1 1 2 3 7 1 2 1 7 2 0 2 2 2 3 2 42 42 42 42 4
1 2 4 9 1 9 2 9 3 6 4 1 4 4 4 6 4 74 84 84 84 8
1 3 2 3 7 1 7 2 7 3 4 3 9 4 2 4 44 54 64 64 6
1 4 4 8 2 1 3 8 5 2 6 3 7 0 7 5 7 88 08 18 28 2
1 5 2 3 7 1 9 3 6 4 9 6 0 6 7 7 27 57 77 87 9
16 4 9 24 51 76 97 112 123 130 135 138 140 141
17 2 3 7 20 48 73 94 109 120 127 132 135 137
18 4 8 25 63 105 142 171 193 208 219 226 231 234
19 2 3 7 21 60 102 139 167 189 204 215 222 227
20 4 9 26 77 145 208 259 300 330 352 367 378 385
21 2 3 7 21 76 146 210 261 302 332 354 369 380
22 4 8 24 85 183 284 371 443 498 540 570 592 607
23 2 3 7 21 85 186 289 376 448 502 544 574 596
24 4 9 27 102 243 402 545 666 762 838 894 936 966
25 2 3 7 21 100 251 417 563 685 781 857 913 955
26 4 8 24 109 304 539 765 963 1125 1255 1355 1432 1488
27 2 3 7 21 112 324 573 804 1004 1166 1296 1395 1472
28 4 9 26 119 374 715 1062 1375 1639 1856 2027 2161 2262
29 2 3 7 21 119 400 767 1129 1450 1717 1935 2106 2240
30 4 8 25 122 445 924 1437 1921 2340 2692 2975 3201 3376
31 2 3 7 21 125 486 1010 1551 2050 2475 2829 3112 3338
32 4 9 26 129 536 1208 1958 2689 3339 3895 4352 4723 5015
33 2 3 7 21 132 604 1361 2169 2935 3602 4166 4626 4998
34 4 8 24 125 625 1525 2593 3665 4649 5508 6229 6823 7299
35 2 3 7 21 132 713 1732 2891 4022 5036 5911 6638 7234
36 4 9 27 134 732 1934 3434 4987 6451 7755 8868 9799 10558
37 2 3 7 21 133 846 2242 3903 5567 7097 8437 9568 10507
38 4 8 24 126 814 2367 4432 6642 8774 10716 12404 13837 15021
39 2 3 7 21 135 979 2812 5136 7531 9778 11785 13505 14954
40 4 9 26 133 916 2896 5687 8788 11851 14697 17213 19378 21194
41 2 3 7 21 135 1105 3489 6679 10080 13342 16311 18895 21097
42 4 8 25 130 1008 3522 7257 11539 15873 19974 23667 26891 29631
43 2 3 7 21 135 1249 4343 8684 13442 18099 22406 26218 29508
44 4 9 26 131 1120 4306 9279 15152 21224 27068 32417 37149 41221
45 2 3 7 21 135 1419 5424 11323 17965 24581 30784 36354 41215
46 4 8 24 126 1184 5071 11518 19406 27777 35985 43618 50470 56440
47 2 3 7 21 135 1542 6483 14196 23182 32363 41127 49115 56181
48 4 9 27 137 1274 5967 14258 24772 36200 47614 58390 68194 76840
49 2 3 7 21 135 1671 7809 17946 30127 42835 55152 66526 76707
50 4 8 24 127 1322 6975 17592 31489 46944 62648 77696 91560 103936
51 2 3 7 21 135 1817 9408 22637 38988 56388 73491 89481 103955
52 4 9 26 131 1411 8236 21764 40004 60705 82105 102907 122311 139836
53 2 3 7 21 135 1900 11121 28194 49904 73431 96935 119205 139590
54 4 8 25 130 1440 9390 26306 49880 77277 106112 134567 161450 186006
55 2 3 7 21 135 2013 13035 34721 63133 94599 126549 157228 185628
14Figure 3: Non monotonicity (even values of ¯ w), n =6 ,˜ q = 1
2
3.2 Conﬁgurations when ¯ w is not constrained (˜ q is constrained)
In the previous section, we have seen how to evaluate in exhaustive way the Cn(˜ q, ¯ w)s e t s .
Here, we are going to study the sets Cn(˜ q,.) :f o rag i v e nq u o t ai np r o p o r t i o n( ˜ q), a given
number of players we list and count all the conﬁgurations, whatever the number of weights.
The diﬀerent computations show that, as in the previous section, if the C
B
n (˜ q,.) and the
C
SS










Using the methodology presented in section 2, we increment ¯ w until we have α new
values not leading to a new conﬁguration. The cases with 3 or 4 players are illustrated in
section 2 (table 4 and table A.1). For a given n, in the majority case, table 7 gives the
number of conﬁgurations when ¯ w<w 0. Table 7 corresponds to the cumulative version of








15When this value is constant as w0 increases, the convergence is obtained. For n =3 ,...,6,
the convergence principle is illustrated in the ﬁgure 4 for the majority case. From table 7,
we know that k = {4,8,16,32} for the 1/2 case with n = {3,4,5,6}. We know that k>60
when n = 7 (see Figure 5).
For the 2/3 case, table A.4 corresponds to the cumulative version of table A.3, where








for which ﬁgure 6 gives an illustration of the convergence principle. Let us notice that the
k = {4,7,13,27} for the 2/3 case with n = {3,4,5,6} which is less than the corresponding
value in the majority case.
Finally, table 8 reports the number of conﬁgurations for the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik
indices for these two particular values of ˜ q.
16Table 7: Cumulative number of conﬁgurations cumul according to ¯ w and n with ˜ q =1 /2
¯ w
n 3 4 5 6 7891 01 11 21 31 4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 111111
2 2 2 2 2 2 2 222222
3 3 3 3 3 3 3 333333
4 4 5 5 5 5 5 555555
5 4 6 7 7 7 7 777777
6 4 8 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 11 11 11 11 11 1
7 4 8 1 2 1 4 1 5 1 5 1 51 51 51 51 51 5
84 9 16 20 22 23 23 23 23 23 23 23
9 4 9 1 7 2 4 2 8 3 0 3 13 13 13 13 13 1
10 4 9 20 32 39 43 45 46 46 46 46 46
11 4 9 20 35 47 54 58 60 61 61 61 61
12 4 9 24 45 64 76 83 87 89 90 90 90
13 4 9 24 49 74 93 105 112 116 118 119 119
14 4 9 26 61 96 126 145 157 164 168 170 171
15 4 9 26 63 108 148 178 197 209 216 220 222
16 4 9 27 76 139 195 240 270 289 301 308 312
17 4 9 27 77 153 227 288 333 363 382 394 401
18 4 9 27 90 193 296 381 448 493 523 542 554
19 4 9 27 90 207 338 452 543 610 655 685 704
20 4 9 27 105 260 436 592 718 815 882 927 957
21 4 9 27 105 277 493 695 863 995 1092 1159 1204
22 4 9 27 115 336 624 896 1126 1307 1446 1543 1610
23 4 9 27 115 347 688 1035 1336 1579 1767 1906 2003
24 4 9 27 126 422 865 1323 1725 2053 2310 2505 2644
25 4 9 27 126 436 951 1518 2034 2464 2806 3070 3265
26 4 9 27 132 521 1180 1915 2594 3165 3625 3982 4254
27 4 9 27 132 530 1279 2169 3023 3760 4362 4837 5202
28 4 9 27 136 623 1571 2713 3818 4782 5577 6210 6701
29 4 9 27 136 629 1684 3048 4421 5644 6669 7496 8145
30 4 9 27 137 727 2052 3776 5535 7113 8450 9535 10396
31 4 9 27 137 729 2173 4203 6350 8331 10031 11431 12551
32 4 9 27 138 840 2634 5175 7883 10407 12591 14404 15867
33 4 9 27 138 843 2782 5734 9003 12121 14865 17170 19049
34 4 9 27 138 949 3332 6997 11086 15018 18510 21462 23888
35 4 9 27 138 950 3476 7668 12553 17363 21704 25422 28503
36 4 9 27 138 1067 4156 9316 15363 21365 26823 31533 35463
37 4 9 27 138 1067 4326 10182 17337 24606 31322 37185 42125
38 4 9 27 138 1169 5106 12262 21060 30052 38429 45786 52030
39 4 9 27 138 1169 5264 13271 23577 34378 44588 53673 61447
40 4 9 27 138 1270 6189 15899 28465 41724 54343 65646 75376
41 4 9 27 138 1270 6349 17138 31730 47530 62802 76637 88654
42 4 9 27 138 1350 7404 20427 38105 57350 76077 93151 108077
43 4 9 27 138 1350 7544 21873 42245 64998 87483 108217 126508
44 4 9 27 138 1433 8790 25997 50515 78041 105404 130795 153327
45 4 9 27 138 1433 8951 27784 55872 88203 120841 151452 178857
46 4 9 27 138 1490 10292 32755 66380 105279 144785 182035 215581
47 4 9 27 138 1490 10413 34690 72870 118249 165090 209754 250296
48 4 9 27 138 1548 11958 40777 86213 140471 196784 250784 300065
49 4 9 27 138 1548 12085 43129 94445 157377 223762 288111 347317
50 4 9 27 138 1578 13757 50470 111272 186114 265484 342828 414377
51 4 9 27 138 1578 13847 53064 121313 207635 300644 392282 477740
52 4 9 27 138 1611 15714 61917 142426 244562 355161 464713 567394
53 4 9 27 138 1611 15801 64919 154851 272100 401067 530221 652257
54 4 9 27 138 1629 17751 75360 180979 319100 471752 625384 771280
55 4 9 27 138 1629 17819 78588 195834 353537 530693 710951 883496
17Table 8: Number of conﬁgurations for the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik indices of power for
a given ˜ q





7 1 663 1 440
8 63 583 44 934
Figure 4: all weight repartitions, n =3 ,...,6, ˜ q = 1
2
18Figure 5: all weight repartitions, n =7 ,˜ q = 1
2
Figure 6: all weight repartitions, n =3 ,...,6, ˜ q = 2
3
193.3 Conﬁgurations when ˜ q is not constrained (¯ w is constrained)
Table 9 reports the conﬁgurations number for the Banzhaf and the Shapley-Shubik indices
when ¯ w is ﬁxed, whatever the quota. As n  4a n d ¯ w  5, there are more Banzhaf
conﬁgurations: e e eC
B





Table 10 shows diﬀerent cardinalities of those two sets in the case of 4 players when
¯ w = 10. The crosses correspond to new conﬁgurations and the dots to a conﬁguration
associated with a smaller value of q. The last line, “Number of conﬁgurations for a given q”
illustrates the equivalence of cardinality of the set of conﬁgurations. When the quota is 6,
there are 8 conﬁgurations13. With a quota of 7, there are seven conﬁgurations for Banzhaf
and Shapley-Shubik14. Moreover, the line “Number of new conﬁgurations” indicates 3
conﬁgurations with q = 7 not present in C
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20Table 9: Conﬁgurations when ˜ q is not constrained (¯ w is constrained)
n =3 n =4 n =5 n =6 n =7 n =8
¯ w Bz SS Bz SS Bz SS Bz SS Bz SS Bz SS
1 111111 11 1111
2 222222 22 2222
3 333333 33 3333
4 334444 44 4444
5 447687 87 8787
6 4488 10 9 11 10 11 10 11 10
7 44 10 9 16 14 20 16 21 17 21 17
8 44 11 11 20 20 26 24 29 25 30 26
9 44 11 10 25 23 36 33 45 38 50 40
10 44 12 11 31 30 50 48 61 57 69 61
11 44 12 11 35 32 62 58 84 78 100 88
12 44 12 11 42 39 82 78 115 110 139 129
13 44 12 11 42 38 98 92 151 143 190 177
14 44 12 11 50 46 124 118 194 188 253 247
15 44 12 11 49 45 139 130 243 234 330 319
16 44 12 11 53 49 170 163 314 298 438 420
17 44 12 11 54 50 186 177 379 365 555 539
18 44 12 11 57 53 230 220 480 462 724 700
19 44 12 11 56 52 242 232 554 541 888 872
20 44 12 11 57 53 286 273 689 666 1131 1100
21 44 12 11 56 52 294 283 792 768 1380 1350
22 44 12 11 57 53 342 330 967 947 1718 1685
23 44 12 11 57 53 353 341 1094 1072 2051 2028
24 44 12 11 57 53 398 383 1328 1299 2549 2509
25 44 12 11 57 53 397 384 1453 1418 2989 2943
26 44 12 11 57 53 451 435 1753 1716 3675 3621
27 44 12 11 57 53 440 425 1901 1854 4265 4218
28 44 12 11 57 53 479 464 2244 2190 5158 5084
29 44 12 11 57 53 480 466 2403 2366 5901 5861
30 44 12 11 57 53 508 490 2846 2779 7166 7079
31 44 12 11 57 53 506 490 2985 2937 8050 7997
32 44 12 11 57 53 530 510 3485 3419 9661 9573
33 44 12 11 57 53 521 503 3656 3582 10842 10759
34 44 12 11 57 53 539 521 4205 4129 12821 12717
35 44 12 11 57 53 534 516 4369 4286 14232 14137
36 44 12 11 57 53 550 531 5026 4924 16862 16720
37 44 12 11 57 53 546 527 5128 5037 18482 18382
38 44 12 11 57 53 552 533 5836 5722 21762 21609
39 44 12 11 57 53 548 529 5958 5838 23768 23652
40 44 12 11 57 53 553 534 6650 6505 27593 27407
41 44 12 11 57 53 553 534 6784 6647 29929 29787
42 44 12 11 57 53 554 535 7578 7430 34945 34749
43 44 12 11 57 53 554 535 7618 7466 37347 37200
44 44 12 11 57 53 555 536 8412 8244 43252 43038
45 44 12 11 57 53 554 535 8467 8282 46354 46172
46 44 12 11 57 53 555 536 9188 8994 53083 52842
47 44 12 11 57 53 555 536 9255 9070 56571 56410
48 44 12 11 57 53 555 536 10031 9784 64957 64640
49 44 12 11 57 53 555 536 10002 9789 68258 68059
50 44 12 11 57 53 555 536 10694 10423 77925 77590
21Table 10: Conﬁgurations according to q when ¯ w =1 0
q =6 q =7 q =8 q =9 for all q
Conﬁgurations B SS B SS B SS B SS B SS
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4) X X . . X X
Number of new conﬁgurations 8 8 3 2 1 1 0 0 12 11
Number of conﬁgurations for a given q 8 8 7 7 8 8 7 7 12 11
223.4 Conﬁgurations when ˜ q and ¯ w are not constrained
Our results show that the union of the diﬀerent sets Cn(˜ q,.) gives a larger set for Banzhaf
as soon as n ≥ 4: e e eC
B
n (.,.)





This results is induced by the diﬀerent values of ˜ q as seen in the previous section.
Finally, ﬁgures 8 and 9 show the diﬀerent convergences from 3 to 6 players for Banzhaf
and Shapley-Shubik and the diﬀerent cardinalities are reported in table 11.
Table 11: Number of conﬁgurations for Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik for all quotas






7 14 710 14 178
23Figure 8: Banzhaf conﬁgurations convergence for all quotas, n =3 ,...,6,
Figure 9: Shapley-Shubik conﬁgurations convergence for all quotas, n =3 ,...,6,
244C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper, we present a method to enumerate all the possible conﬁgurations for the two
main important power indices, Shapley-Shubik and Banzhaf. We show that the conﬁgura-
tions number is not monotonous with the number of weights which reinforce the use of the
proposed methodology. It will be obvious to generate all the conﬁgurations with a high num-
ber of weights. Hence, when listing all the conﬁgurations for a given quota (in proportion)
whatever the total number of weights, we propose a convergence principle which leads to
give the conﬁgurations, beginning the computation with the smallest values of repartitions.
A certain number of tables are presented. Obviously, all the tables that we can obtain are
not in the text. For example, when ˜ q is given, we ﬁxi tt o1 /2o rt o2 /3i ng e n e r a l . T h e
same tables can be obtained for any value of ˜ q ∈ [1/2,1 [ .I nt h es a m ew a y ,t h ee n t i r el i s t
of conﬁgurations is not given for an obvious lack of space. However, as soon as we give the
number of conﬁgurations, we can present all of them. Even if we give some results for an
important number of players or a high sum of weights, we are limited by the performance of
the computer. For instance, when we do not ﬁx˜ q and ¯ w, the exhaustive approach becomes
too time consuming for a number of players greater than 7. The purpose of research in the
future is to use a simulation approach. The idea is to simulate many repartitions of weights
to generate all the possible conﬁgurations. In our opinion, this approach is pregnant and
will permit to increase noticeably the size of the parameters.
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Table A.2: Convergence of the conﬁgurations set according to ¯ w with n =4and ˜ q =1 /2
¯ w
	















































































































































































































































27Table A.3: Number of conﬁgurations according to ¯ w and n with ˜ q =2 /3
¯ w
n 3 4 5 678 91 01 1 1 2 1 3 1 4
1 1 1 1 111 1 1 1 1 1 1
2 2 2 2 222 2 2 2 2 2 2
3 2 2 2 222 2 2 2 2 2 2
4 3 4 4 444 4 4 4 4 4 4
5 3 4 5 555 5 5 5 5 5 5
6 4 6 7 888 8 8 8 8 8 8
7 3 6 891 01 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0 1 0
8 3 7 1 0 1 21 31 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4 1 4
9 4 8 1 2 1 51 71 8 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9 1 9
1 0 3 7 1 4 1 92 22 4 2 5 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6 2 6
1 1 3 7 1 5 2 12 62 9 3 1 3 2 3 3 3 3 3 3 3 3
1 2 4 8 1 9 3 03 74 2 4 5 4 7 4 8 4 9 4 9 4 9
1 3 3 7 1 8 3 14 24 9 5 4 5 7 5 9 6 0 6 1 6 1
1 4 3 7 2 1 4 05 56 6 7 3 7 8 8 1 8 3 8 4 8 5
15 4 9 22 44 64 78 89 96 101 104 106 107
16 3 7 21 49 77 99 114 125 132 137 140 142
17 3 7 21 50 83 111 132 147 158 165 170 173
18 4 9 24 68 116 156 186 208 223 234 241 246
19 3 7 21 66 121 171 211 241 263 278 289 296
20 3 7 21 75 150 219 273 315 345 367 382 393
21 4 9 25 83 168 250 320 374 415 445 467 482
22 3 7 21 84 194 304 398 473 529 571 601 623
23 3 7 21 87 212 343 460 554 629 684 726 756
24 4 9 27 102 265 440 596 724 823 900 956 998
25 3 7 21 91 265 468 657 817 946 1045 1122 1178
26 3 7 21 97 304 561 802 1012 1181 1314 1415 1492
27 4 9 26 109 348 650 945 1202 1416 1585 1718 1818
28 3 7 21 101 375 747 1118 1451 1729 1953 2127 2262
29 3 7 21 101 397 830 1277 1681 2026 2306 2530 2704
30 4 9 27 121 490 1034 1596 2113 2556 2922 3212 3441
31 3 7 21 101 475 1092 1757 2378 2921 3374 3743 4034
32 3 7 21 101 536 1298 2129 2913 3601 4182 4653 5031
33 4 9 26 122 587 1433 2393 3319 4150 4860 5448 5921
34 3 7 21 101 599 1600 2782 3941 4984 5883 6630 7238
35 3 7 21 101 621 1704 3038 4380 5623 6707 7626 8379
36 4 9 27 130 753 2112 3785 5473 7029 8398 9555 10512
37 3 7 21 101 703 2137 4002 5944 7782 9420 10831 12007
38 3 7 21 101 765 2489 4791 7203 9481 11521 13277 14754
39 4 9 26 127 871 2817 5413 8180 10849 13271 15390 17184
40 3 7 21 101 839 3059 6201 9593 12871 15863 18483 20718
41 3 7 21 101 858 3276 6829 10738 14577 18118 21259 23958
42 4 9 27 132 1005 3854 8072 12775 17428 21757 25609 28943
43 3 7 21 101 903 3864 8547 13932 19352 24447 29037 33036
44 3 7 21 101 949 4339 9776 16121 22591 28734 34299 39188
45 4 9 26 129 1088 4858 11042 18348 25878 33088 39683 45512
46 3 7 21 101 984 5057 12114 20652 29589 38236 46194 53278
47 3 7 21 101 994 5416 13349 23129 33480 43573 52957 61359
48 4 9 27 132 1214 6487 15897 27453 39745 51823 63086 73238
49 3 7 21 101 1032 6356 16624 29704 43822 57824 71025 83000
50 3 7 21 101 1047 7033 19015 34434 51152 67835 83607 97994
51 4 9 26 128 1245 7908 21129 38352 57329 76491 94819 111664
52 3 7 21 101 1054 8016 23033 43140 65491 88209 110018 130163
53 3 7 21 101 1062 8401 24742 47059 72292 98233 123412 146861
54 4 9 27 133 1311 9951 29176 55392 85093 115786 145664 173604
55 3 7 21 101 1067 9535 29892 58777 92164 127091 161469 193875
28Table A.4: Cumulative number of conﬁgurations according to ¯ w and n with ˜ q =2 /3
¯ w
n 3 4 5 6 78 91 01 11 21 31 4
1 1 1 1 1 1 1111111
2 2 2 2 2 2 2222222
3 3 3 3 3 3 3333333
4 4 5 5 5 5 5555555
5 4 6 7 7 7 7777777
6 4 8 1 0 1 1 1 1 1 11 11 11 11 11 11 1
74 9 13 15 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16
8 4 9 1 5 1 9 2 1 2 22 22 22 22 22 22 2
9 4 9 1 9 2 6 3 0 3 23 33 33 33 33 33 3
10 4 9 22 33 40 44 46 47 47 47 47 47
11 4 9 23 38 49 56 60 62 63 63 63 63
12 4 9 26 50 68 80 87 91 93 94 94 94
13 4 9 27 57 83 101 113 120 124 126 127 127
14 4 9 27 62 98 125 143 155 162 166 168 169
15 4 9 27 74 128 169 198 217 229 236 240 242
16 4 9 27 83 154 212 254 283 302 314 321 325
17 4 9 27 87 173 251 310 352 381 400 412 419
18 4 9 27 102 220 335 423 487 531 561 580 592
19 4 9 27 109 250 396 516 605 669 713 743 762
20 4 9 27 111 279 463 624 747 837 901 945 975
21 4 9 27 121 340 587 813 989 1120 1214 1280 1325
22 4 9 27 125 382 693 987 1225 1404 1536 1630 1696
23 4 9 27 125 411 789 1160 1472 1713 1893 2025 2119
24 4 9 27 131 493 1000 1502 1936 2275 2531 2719 2855
25 4 9 27 132 536 1144 1769 2323 2770 3112 3369 3557
26 4 9 27 132 569 1291 2065 2767 3351 3806 4151 4409
27 4 9 27 133 658 1585 2603 3536 4327 4950 5427 5785
28 4 9 27 133 711 1807 3057 4230 5242 6057 6688 7168
29 4 9 27 133 741 2002 3513 4969 6244 7292 8116 8750
30 4 9 27 133 851 2437 4382 6285 7966 9369 10481 11343
31 4 9 27 133 898 2710 5033 7366 9465 11239 12672 13793
32 4 9 27 133 923 2974 5744 8598 11209 13444 15278 16730
33 4 9 27 133 1010 3519 7022 10679 14053 16962 19373 21296
34 4 9 27 133 1054 3908 8070 12524 16690 20325 23369 25830
35 4 9 27 133 1067 4216 9053 14384 19463 23954 27757 30871
36 4 9 27 133 1171 4986 11021 17767 24248 30020 34933 38989
37 4 9 27 133 1201 5426 12398 20398 28230 35298 41384 46455
38 4 9 27 133 1211 5835 13895 23409 32881 41532 49052 55374
39 4 9 27 133 1280 6752 16570 28333 40170 51069 60611 68677
40 4 9 27 133 1301 7326 18642 32552 46774 60031 71741 81723
41 4 9 27 133 1303 7770 20628 36906 53846 69837 84101 96361
42 4 9 27 133 1359 8926 24536 44582 65625 85616 103535 119015
43 4 9 27 133 1368 9552 27253 50596 75525 99482 121168 140047
44 4 9 27 133 1369 10065 30002 57068 86509 115144 141316 164288
45 4 9 27 133 1396 11351 35124 67944 103992 139274 171702 200299
46 4 9 27 133 1400 12105 38908 76872 119231 161201 200120 234718
47 4 9 27 133 1400 12635 42466 86055 135529 185162 231626 273254
48 4 9 27 133 1422 14247 49606 101995 161948 222530 279556 330898
49 4 9 27 133 1424 15013 54328 114186 183846 255083 322790 384222
50 4 9 27 133 1424 15597 59123 127501 208436 292179 372479 445878
51 4 9 27 133 1437 17240 68120 149409 246521 347675 445195 534749
52 4 9 27 133 1437 18091 74557 167240 279737 398208 513392 619921
53 4 9 27 133 1437 18603 80344 185019 314410 452297 587585 713646
54 4 9 27 133 1439 20526 92412 216229 370614 536138 699363 852108
55 4 9 27 133 1439 21331 100106 239529 416352 608136 798992 978902
29